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NORMAN I. SILBER*

Anticonsultative Trends in

Nonprofit Governance
I
ACCOUNTABILITY, VIABILITY, AND CONSULTATION

P

rompted by economic, political, and cultural changes
buffeting the nonprofit sector, public demand for greater
financial accountability on the part of nonprofit organizations
has intensified in recent decades.' Increasingly, this demand is
reflected by the imposition of new legal standards on directors
and managers, and also on the employees and consultants on
which they rely. These newer impositions include additional
federal and state disclosure rules, changes to state corporation

* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. This article was prepared
originally as a discussion paper for the Annual Conference of the Association for
Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Associations (ARNOVA),
November 2006, at which the other participants were David Brennen, Evelyn
Brody, Susan Gary, Robert Katz, and Mark Sidel. This discussion, in turn,
extended conversations that developed out of an earlier ARNOVA panel on
democratic values as expressed through nonprofit governance. Those participants
included Evelyn Brody, David Hammack, Dana Brakman Reiser, and Mark Sidel.
I express gratitude to them and to Putnam Barber, Burnele Venable Powell, and
Jack Siegel for debating several of the views I have expressed here. Thanks to
Eireann Brooks, Lara Cahan, and Justin Levy for their diligent research assistance.
1 The origin of this development can be traced to the transformation of
incorporation from a privilege into an entitlement. See NORMAN I. SILBER, A
CORPORATE

FORM OF

FREEDOM:

THE

EMERGENCE

OF

THE

MODERN

NONPROFIT SECTOR 127-59 (2001) (tracing the development of postincorporation
regulatory supervision of nonprofit activity following the demise of the earlier
approach to the approval of nonprofit charters).
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laws and federal tax laws, and stringent court interpretations of
existing common-law fiduciary duties.2
At the same time, the difficulties nonprofit organizations face
in generating sufficient revenue to remain viable and address
fundamental purposes have seldom been greater. Gifts and
bequests continue to decline as a proportion of overall revenue
received.3 Funding through federal and state grants has proven
inadequate.4 Although income earned from the provision of
services, in contrast to income from contributions or grants, has
been the largest and most consistently growing category of
revenue for several decades, services that previously were
provided almost exclusively by nonprofit agencies are today
subject to ever-greater competition from for-profit businesses.5
These twin "accountability" and "viability" challenges have
6
been widely reported.
To remain viable in this difficult
environment, advisors encourage many nonprofit groups to
change their operating and governance structures, to better build
profitable lines of related and unrelated business, to attract feefor-service contracts, and otherwise to find new opportunities for
making money that fit--even if only peripherally-within their
2 See generally Ellen W. McVeigh & Eve R. Borenstein, The Changing
Accountability Climate and Resulting Demands for Improved "Fiduciary Capacity"
Affecting the World of Public Charities,31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 119 (2004).
3 See INDEP. SECTOR, URBAN INST., THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC & DESK
REFERENCE:
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS AND FIGURES FOR MANAGERS,
RESEARCHERS, AND VOLUNTEERS (2002) [hereinafter NONPROFIT ALMANAC];

Leslie Lenkowsky, How Are Nonprofit Finances Changing? New Data Make It
Hard to Tell, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 9,2006, at 34.
4 See generally ALAN J. ABRAMSON ET AL., FY 2006 FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS

RECAP:

IMPACT ON NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

(2005),

http://www.nonprofitresearch.org/usrdoc/FY_2006-AppropriationsFinal.pdf
(stating "[ojur analysis reveals that Congress eventually enacted nearly two-thirds
of the spending cuts in these programs that the president had proposed for FY
2006.").
5 See NONPROFIT ALMANAC, supra note 3; Lenkowsky, supra note 3.
6 Peter Swords, The Form 990 as an Accountability Tool for 501(c)(3) Nonprofits,
51 TAX L. 571, 573-74 (acknowledging that pressure from media enterprises has
resulted in a "negative accountability" for nonprofits, and examining various tools
as a model for encouraging accountability). A third challenge, which has affected
the governance structure of a significant number of nonprofits, especially those
operating internationally, has only recently received some attention: that posed by
imperatives of security embodied in the USA PATRIOT Act and other measures
addressing concern about terrorism in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. See
MARK SIDEL, MORE SECURE, LESS FREE? ANTITERRORISM POLICY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 87-115 (2004).
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missions.7

It is an underappreciated

consequence of the

convergence of these developments that is the focus of this
discussion: what I will refer to as "anticonsultative" and
"anticollaborative" imperatives."
Adaptation to any new legal environment often calls for
outside advice and counsel, and the nonprofit environment is no
exception. With increasing frequency, scholars, attorneys, and
consultants are advising groups that seek to comply with
nonprofit laws and enhance their financial performance to turn
away from several popular cultural traditions and conventional

legal norms that characterized nonprofit governance.

In

particular, they advise a turn from older patterns of decision
making and an older advice literature, which, by and large,
encouraged collaboration and consultation in the normal course
of internal organization and governance.9
The newer advice is different. It is framed in terms of
achieving very important general objectives, including "strategic
positioning,"1 ° and providing greater transparency to outside
7 See Michael H. Shuman & Merrian Fuller, Profitsfor Justice,THE NATION, Jan.
24, 2005, at 13, 20-21 (challenging fellow nonprofit activists to develop other ways
to generate revenue and to "try to wean ourselves from the charity habit, say by 3
percent per year. Think about just one piece of your agenda that could be framed
as a revenue generator, dream about it a little, develop a business plan, and give it a
try.").
8 The NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY defines the verb "consult" as
meaning "to have discussions or confer with (someone)," as in "they've got to
consult with their board of directors." (2d ed. 2001) (emphasis omitted). The Latin
root is "consulere," meaning "take counsel." Id. (emphasis omitted). The same
dictionary defines the verb "collaborate" as to "work jointly on an activity"; the
root in Latin means "work together." Id. (emphasis omitted).
One common understanding of nonprofit "collaboration" involves activity
undertaken through joint ventures, rather than intraorganizational cooperationbut that is not the sense in which it is used throughout this discussion. For purposes
of this discussion, collaborative acts involve collective assumption of responsibility
for decisions; consultative acts involve actions by decision makers to seek advice or
consent from others.
9 Peter F. Drucker, a management specialist, recognized the special place of
dissent and mission orientation. He stated, "[t]oday, nonprofits understand that
they need management all the more because they have no conventional bottom
line. Now they need to learn how to use management so they can concentrate on
their mission." PETER F. DRUCKER & CONSTANCE ROSSUM, HOW TO ASSESS
YOUR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION, WITH PETER DRUCKER'S FIVE MOST
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS: USER GUIDE FOR BOARDS, STAFF, VOLUNTEERS, AND

FACILITATORS 2 (1993).
10 See, e.g., THOMAS A. MCLAUGHLIN, NONPROFIT STRATEGIC POSITIONING:
DECIDE WHERE TO BE, PLAN WHATTO Do, at xviii (2006). McLaughlin states,
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12
observers;1' creating a more vibrant "culture of accountability";
instituting more rigorous internal controls; and facilitating more
adaptability to market conditions.13 With few variations, this
advice often counsels the adoption of strategies for
"streamlining" nonprofit governance along for-profit business
principles in order to augment "corporate efficiency, and
management development," all4 in the name, ultimately, of
service to the nonprofit mission.'

Along the way, in many cases, consultative procedures for
decision making and collaborative assignments of responsibility
are subtly and not so subtly being identified as impediments to
accountability for strong financial performance, and as barriers
to the efficient accomplishment of mission-related goals. As
substitutes, hierarchical, formal, executive, and even autocratic
Strategic positioning is a streamlined approach.... [T]he clear distinction
between the roles of the board and the executive helps prevent the
confusions and misunderstandings that often accompany traditional
approaches. It is a waste of time-and possibly worse-for board members
to be involved in anything having to do with operations, including planning
them.
Id. See also, e.g., John H. Goddeeris & Burton A. Weisbrod, Conversion from
Nonprofit to For-Profit Legal Status: Why Does It Happen and Should Anyone
Care? in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION
OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 129 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed. 1998) (explaining that
conversion to for-profit structures occurs due to legal, regulatory, and constraint
changes in the environment of the organization.).
11 See RICHARD E. OLIVER, WHAT IS TRANSPARENCY? 7-8 (2004) (explaining
that transparency is critical for nonprofits with regard to reputation and continued
donations); see also, e.g., DAN TAPSCOTr & DAVID TICOLL, THE NAKED
CORPORATION:

HOW THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY WILL REVOLUTIONIZE

BUSINESS (2003).
12 See George G. Brenkert, The Need for Corporate Integrity, in CORPORATE
INTEGRITY & ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 9-10 (George G. Brenkert ed. 2004) (discussing
the growing trend of corporate accountability and the "obvious extension" of that
trend to nonprofit organizations); see also, e.g., THE 2004 GRANT THORNTON
NAT'L BOARD GOVERNANCE SURVEY FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORG. [hereinafter

GRANT THORNTON SURVEY] (Grant Thornton, LLP, U.S. member firm of Grant
Thornton Int'l), Sept. 2004, at 9, available at http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/
GTCom/files/Industries/NotforProfit/GrantThornton_Board_GovernanceSurvey
_2004.pdf (a survey of 700 nonprofit CEOs indicated that 24 percent had engaged
their external auditor to examine their internal controls; 90 percent of those
questioned indicated that their auditors had produced a management letter).
13 See, e.g., GRANT THORNTON SURVEY, supra note 12; Shuman & Fuller, supra
note 7.
14 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 10, at 22.
Mclaughlin reserves the term
"collaboration" for cooperation among nonprofits, rather than within them. See id.
at 82-88.
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procedures and organizational structures largely borrowed from
the for-profit business world are being identified as positive
reforms and essential legal requirements in the new climate for
nonprofit activity.' 5
Many nonprofits, of course, don't need to be counseled to
change in these ways because they have never operated along
especially consultative or collaborative lines.16 Nor does it seem
likely that any neat pattern would emerge if nonprofits were
measured by the degree to which they currently operate and
or
consultatively.
themselves
hierarchically
govern
Furthermore, some business models are not intrinsically
anticonsultative or anticollaborative. 17 But the trend I along
with others observe is an across-the-board, norm-shifting change
in the impetus to develop certain business-like operating
practices.
If this claim is accurate, it is time to review the role of laws
and legal institutions in promoting, inhibiting, or acquiescing to
the anticollaborative, anticonsultative trend. Until now, the
15 At least one nonprofit relief organization has even begun holding
"shareholders' meetings." Stephanie Strom, Charity Invites Donors to 'Kick the
Tires' and Squeeze the Cash Register, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A14.
Administrative solutions have also been advanced. See Victor B. Flatt, Notice and
Comment for Nonprofit Organizations, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 65, 72-79 (2002)
(proposing a procedure, along the lines of the Administrative Procedure Act, to
improve accountability within nonprofit organizations).
16 It is not unusual for foundations and trusts to operate on somewhat
authoritarian lines, based on the founding documents of their benefactors or the
advice of their agents. Within certain parts of the nonprofit sector, hierarchical
structures are more common than in others. For example, among religious groups
there is a wide degree of variation in the level to which voluntary organizations
adopt a hierarchical or more participatory organizational structure. See, e.g.,
HENRY BIBB ET AL., MAKING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES
159-203 (David C. Hammack ed. 1998) (describing the varieties of nonprofit
religious groups).
17 Compare JIM COLLINS, GOOD TO GREAT: WHY SOME COMPANIES MAKE
THE LEAP ... AND OTHERS DON'T 13 (2001) ("When you have disciplined people,
you don't need hierarchy. When you have disciplined thought, you don't need
bureaucracy. When you have disciplined action, you don't need excessive controls.
When you combine a culture of discipline with an ethic of entrepreneurship, you get
the magical alchemy of great performance.") with Anders Porter, Taking Care of
Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.sweden.se/templates/cs/
Business in Sweden,
Article
15632.aspx (discussing Swedish business practices and stating "Swedish
companies tend to be less hierarchical than companies in many other countries
when it comes to internal organization. This . . . eras[es] some of the chain-ofcommand arrangements that exist in other countries. . . . [I]t's possible for
employees to take their comments, questions or concerns directly to the boss.").
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ways the law accommodates and encourages such transplanted
business models with new statutory proscriptions and
administrative guidelines, and allows relaxed common-law
interpretations of the older statutes which demote consultative
values, have received little study.' 8 But some commentators
express concern. As Paul C. Light has written, "[j]ust because
the nonprofit sector needs to improve its performance does not
necessarily mean it has to become more businesslike."'1 9
There might be no point to challenging or regretting the
movement of the law as it responds to these newer imperatives.
Becoming more businesslike, after all, has saved many
nonprofits from the brink of financial disaster-and it builds
capacity for mission accomplishment in many others. 2 0 To a
considerable extent, larger social and economic conditions have
forged the anticonsultative legal reformation.
If becoming
increasingly businesslike is a practical necessity-and if it
requires relaxing the legal constraints which have imposed
consultative and collaborative norms-then relaxation of these
rules is the desirable response.
Equally cautionary to those who would think about restoring
traditional constraints are questions about appropriate legal
boundaries: perhaps matters of internal deliberative process are,
and should be, irrelevant as a matter of state-ordered nonprofit
law.
Why should the public law care how a nonprofit
accomplishes
its
mission
through
private
corporate
understandings, so long as the nonprofit is effective in working
toward its approved goals? If only "ends" should count, then the
time has come to bury the legal demand for collaboration-and
to embrace the idea that consultation, collaboration, and
democratic values are important only insofar as they are
valuable tools in the accomplishment of a nonprofit mission.2'
18 See infra Part II.
19 Paul C. Light, "Nonprofit-Like" Tongue Twister or Aspiration? 8 NONPROFIT
Q., at 4, 4 (Summer 2001, issue 2), available at http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/

section/87.html.
20 See

Mike

Woelflein,

Foundations of

Community,

BANGORMETRO,

http://www.bangormetro.com/media/Bangor-Metro/October-2005/Foundations-ofCommunity/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2007) (taking an investment firm approach to
organization, the Maine Community Fund weathered the recession following 9/11
and has since seen dramatic revenue increases).
21 States charter nonprofit organizations which establish legitimate purposes and
missions under their governing laws. The Internal Revenue Service and other
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On the other hand, it is possible that legal institutions should
treat more seriously the claim that a great number of nonprofits,
in addition to distinguishing themselves from for-profits through
their formal commitment to the "nondistribution constraint,"
possess distinctive associational attributes that collectively
identify, enhance, and justify the special treatment they receive
from courts and legislatures.
It could be that these
characteristics have played a crucial role in fostering deliberative
discourse, creating social capital, and providing a foundation for
expressive pluralism.2
Regulatory actors, legislatures, and
professional groups might then establish minimal levels of
consultation and collaboration through the collective assignment
of fiduciary responsibilities for some or all classes of nonprofits.
If legal institutions embrace such an interventionist
perspective, and this article does not conclude that they
necessarily should, then reinforcement of process-oriented rules
deserves further consideration, including governance reforms
ranging from strengthened consultative procedures, to more
rigorous legal standards to assess the process of mission
performance, to compulsory constituent representation in
management or board decision making. Limits could also be
imposed on the wholesale adoption of for-profit management
and governance models in nonprofit organizations. Functional
disincentives to engaging in inconsistent for-profit activities, such
as taxes on unrelated business income, or strictures against
excessive compensation, could be strengthened. Restraining
entrepreneurial approaches, or encouraging collaborative and
consultative ones, could reinforce traditional consultative legal
norms instead of jettisoning them.
The short exploration below of legal developments in
nonprofit governance related to corporate advice literature,
nonprofit boards, management practices, ind membership rights

taxing bodies confer eligibility for tax exemption based in significant part on the
extent to which the missions and purposes of the organization comply with relevant
statutory provisions and enforcement agencies-particularly the office of the
attorney general-and evaluate the performance of nonprofit organizations based
not on collaborativeness, but rather on the relationship between their activities and
their avowed purposes and missions. Few, if any, rankings or evaluations of
nonprofit organizations base their findings substantially on internal processes as
opposed to external results.
22 See generally SILBER, supra note 1.
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might contribute to understanding which of these views-if
either of them-might be correct.
II
THE CORPORATE ADVICE LITERATURE

It is unnecessary to dwell on whether the accountability and
viability challenges mentioned above are real and significant
because•• the
literature in nonprofit studies contains ample
23
validation.
Conferences devoted to these subjects are held
24
every year.
Enforcement proceedings brought against
nonprofits related to instances of financial mismanagement have
become more numerous. Leaders of nonprofit organizations
profess regret that they spend more and more time on the
improvement of their "bottom line" than on accomplishing their
missions.25
It is more controversial to observe that, notwithstanding
cautionary verbiage to the contrary, much of the advice that
consultants provide to nonprofit boards and managers actually
takes aim at collaborative and consultative traditions through its
support for isolating and particularizing organizational
responsibilities, creating businesslike hierarchies, and truncating
collective decision making. Notwithstanding the homage that
the consulting literature often pays to the need to sustain a
"collaborative" culture or a "positive" working environment,
true enthusiasm for consultative and collective activity is usually
absent from consulting reports and guidance, because, from the
point of view of addressing these accountability/viability
23 See, e.g., Peter Swords, Conference Notes: Norman A. Sugarman Memorial
Lecture, Nonprofit Accountability: The Sector's Response to Gov't Regulation, 25

EXEMPT

ORG.

TAX REV. 413

(1999),

available at http://www.qual990.org/

np-account.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2007) (arguing for stronger generic oversight
agencies).
24 See, e.g., Conference Schedule for Lyndon B. Johnson Sch. of Pub. Affairs at
Univ. of Tex. (Austin), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/rgk/press/presentations.php (last
visited Oct. 8, 2007).
25 See Lester M. Salamon & Richard O'Sullivan, Stressed but Coping: Nonprofit
Organizations and the Current Fiscal Crisis, LISTENING POST PROJEcT

FINDING

COMMUNIQUE No. 2, Jan. 19, 2004, at 1, 1, available at www.jhu.edu/listeningpost/
news/pdf/comm02.pdf (study finds that "American nonprofits have become, in
many cases, highly entrepreneurial organizations, responding actively and creatively
to new fiscal pressures. At the same time, however, the survey also makes clear that
these pressures are exacting a toll.").
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challenges, consultation and collaboration are not helpful.26

Considering the strong bias in our political and social culture
toward open democratic discourse and the universally positive
meaning ascribed to collaboration, however, it would be
surprising if advisors actually went on the record to openly
endorse curtailing these practices.
The newer advice literature urges directors and managerial

personnel to devote greater attention to managerial
accounting;27 to create more "professionalized," "financially
expert" operations;2 8 and to develop "more formal" forms of

business organization.

The implication is that extensive

consultation intrinsically
produces delay and discord.
Embedded is the message that although collaboration might

promote civic virtue, such virtue is not a typical nonprofit
entity's raison d',tre; and that, on the contrary, it can in

important instances diffuse and conceal responsibility (not a
good thing). Effective managerial methods that emulate the best
for-profit business methods for establishing accountability at the
individual level, on the other hand, tend to intensify
and expose
inefficiencies
v. good thing) .29
ineficincis and
ad weak
wak links
ink (a
(avery

26 See, e.g.,

RICHARD P.

CHAIT ET AL.,

GOVERNANCE

AS

LEADERSHIP:

(2005) ("Historically, the
stereotypical image of a nonprofit administrator was a well-intentioned 'do-gooder,'
...trained as a social worker, educator, cleric, artist, or physician.... Yesterday's
naive nonprofit administrator or executive director has become today's
sophisticated president or CEO, titles that betray changes in the stature, perception,
and professionalism of the positions.").
27 See, e.g., Four Tips for Implementing ManagerialAccounting Principles at Your
Nonprofit, NONPROFIT FISCAL FITNESS, Mar., 2005, http://www.blackbaud.com/
files/Newsletters/FiscalFitness/2005/fiscalfitnessmarch2k5.pdf; Press Release, Open
Soc'y Inst., Baltimore Nonprofits Working to Make Their Enterprises More
Businesslike (Dec. 1, 2004), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/baltimore/
news/nonprofits_20041201.
28 William Foster & Gail Fine, How Nonprofits Get Really Big, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION. REV., Spring 2007, at 54, available at http://www.ssireview.org/
images/articles/2007SP-feature fosterfine.pdf
(explaining
that
heightened
professionalism and devotion to a culture of finance are essential elements in the
quest to become big).
29 See, e.g., Jeff McDonald, Conflict over S.D. Office Puts Athletes in the Middle;
Special Olympics Investigation Outrages Group's Donors, Volunteers, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 16, 2007, at Al (describing an investigation of operations in
which "[t]he picture emerging•., was one of an internal struggle over the nonprofit
group's management style and business model." Volunteers for the organization
"described the investigation as a 'turf war' between Jackson and his superiors,
especially Roxanne Thompson . . .now a chief fundraiser for Special Olympics
REFRAMING THE WORK OF NONPROFIT BOARDS 2
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Empirical studies might test whether the new nonprofit
culture of financial effectiveness and accountability increasingly
addresses consultative activities in governance and management,
however obliquely, as unaffordable, unnecessary, and even
counterproductive democratic luxuries. Determining whether
the number of membership organizations has in fact grown or
diminished in recent years, for example, might illuminate one
aspect of the phenomenon, since membership organizations are
traditionally and by nature the most consultative. 30
Also
indicative might be studies to find out whether the rights
attached to membership themselves have become fewer. 31
Tracking changes in the number of self-perpetuating
organizations might also be useful, as it might reveal the
unwillingness of boards to trust their members or classes of
members to play a significant role in the power to determine
successorship.32
It would be interesting to discover whether the vocabulary of
business missions has migrated to the nonprofit world and
supplanted older and more mission-oriented vocabulary. For
example, it would be useful to know whether the number of
leaders who prefer to call themselves "president" or "CEO" of
their nonprofit organizations, rather than, for example,
"executive
director,"
has increased; or whether the
organization's services are routinely called "the product," and its33
reputation referred to as "the franchise" or "the brand.,
Results of this sort might verify the trend-but the question of
Southern California. Jackson has a relaxed management style, they said, and that
didn't sit well with the more organized Thompson.").
30 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of
Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 849-58 (2003) (noting that
nonprofit organizations rely on members as being "decision-makers," "monitors,"
and "enforcers").
31 Norman I. Silber, A Membership Bill of Rights (unpublished manuscript,
presented in 2001 at annual conference for Ass'n for Research on Nonprofit Org.
and Voluntary Action).
32 See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (creatively developing metrics to

argue that a demise in "social capital" has occurred).
33 The competencies and duties of nonprofit leaders are also often defined in
terms more commonly linked to for-profit business leaders. See Shamima Ahmed,
Desired Competencies and Job Duties of Non-Profit CEOs in Relation to the Current
Challenges: Through the Lens of CEOs' Job Advertisements, 24 J. MGMT. DEV. 913
(2005).
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the real significance of the new vocabulary would even then not
remain free of doubt.
The question here at hand is properly addressed not by
empirical analysis of practices but through an investigation of
developing legal norms. How "elastic" has the legal regime
become-and how elastic should it become-in accommodating
34
transplanted business models for governance and organization?
III
LEGAL ACCOMMODATION: THE BOARD

A nonprofit legal regime which for more than two centuries
usually extolled the governance values of democratic expression,
collective action, and broad principles of consultation among
different constituencies might have difficulty-one would
think-doing an abrupt about-face.
Nevertheless, adaptations
have emerged swiftly, by way of courts, state officials, federal
regulators, enforcement bodies, law revisions, and academic
formulations.
A few examples below illustrate that legal
institutions are accommodating new attitudes toward board selfgovernance, management accountability, and membership
involvement by relaxing several existing norms of consultation
and importing different ones from for-profit guides.
A. NondisclosureAgreements
One indicator that attitudes about consultation and sharing
fiduciary responsibilities among board members are changing is
the transition toward formal nondisclosure pledges and
agreements. For as long as there have been boardrooms, board
majorities have tried to prevent dissident directors from raising
policy differences in public or bringing problems to the attention
of regulatory authorities. Recently, however, the dominant
majorities on some nonprofit boards have begun to ask for

34 Of course, this is not the only elasticity of interest. For example, the extent to
which permissible compensation includes bonuses or other incentives based on
financial performance also tests the willingness of the law to relax the
nondistribution constraint in the interest of models for business productivity.
35 But see supra note 16 and accompanying text (indicating that certain nonprofit
organizational traditions, especially those growing out of religious principles of
organization, have involved hierarchical and nonconsultative traditions from the
outset).
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binding pledges not to air differences or even talk to the media
about corporate affairs outside the boardroom.3 6

In the for-

profit world, particularly on large corporate boards, formal
"nondisclosure" or "gag" agreements are not unusual,3 7 and they
are frequently justified as efforts to preserve proprietary
information and to prevent inappropriate insider behavior.
In the nonprofit context, nondisclosure agreements or the use
of "executive session" rules to curtail debates about policy and
procedure depart from established norms. They shut down
opportunities for public dialogue and for communication with
other concerned and influential parties, including reporters.
Until recent decades, and despite a longstanding emphasis by

nonprofits on recruiting board members and managers who are
"team players" and encouraging "closure"

matters,
unknown. 3

nondisclosure

agreements

have

on contentious

been

virtually

Discussions in executive sessions, where views

expressed and subjects discussed are not to be divulged to
36 Hewlett Packard's boardroom soap opera received great notoriety in large part

because private investigators used illegal tactics to obtain the phone records of
dissident board members; less well known is the agreement Hewlett Packard
directors signed which obligated them. See Douglas M. Branson, Built to Last?
Hewlett-Packard's Problems Teach Lessons About Corporate Governance,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 26, 2006, at A10; see also Peter J. Howe, Weld
Lambastes T Pension Board, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 1992, at 72 (board votes to
prevent its members from talking to reporters); Many Knew of Tyco Bonuses,
Witness Says; The Former Head of Human Resources Says Auditors Were Aware of
the Disputed Payments, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at C5 (nondisclosure statements
"asked" for by management from key employees who received compensation
bonuses); Carolyn Said, CorporateDirectorsSee Risks Climbing, S.F. CHRON., Aug.
11, 2002, at 61, 64 (practice of obtaining nondisclosure agreements in the context of
mergers and acquisitions nearly universal); Julie Solomon, Activists Fear SEC Proxy
Rule, BOSTON GLOBE, May 10, 1992, at 33 (restricted ballot initiatives on proxy
statements); Dominic Jones, Corporate Boards Should Communicate More, IR
http://www.irwebreport.com/daily/2006/09/1 1/corporate-boardsReport,
Web
should-communicate-more/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
37 For example, Apple Computer Inc. is known for its closed-lips approach to
market strategy. See Daily Briefing, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 12, 2005, at 26
(reporting on San Jose court narrowing reporters' privilege to reveal employees
who described new Apple products); Nick Wingfield, At Apple, Secrecy Complicates
Life but MaintainsBuzz, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2005, at Al.
38 See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Takeovers: Regulating the Market
for Mission Control, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1181, 1249 (2006) (considering insurgent
friendly and incumbent friendly rules and recommending "[a]n intermediate,
governance-protective standard for reviewing nonprofit takeover defenses most
appropriately resolves these tensions by channeling mission change through an
incremental, dialogic process.").
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anyone else, have traditionally been reserved for personnel
matters and questions concerning pending or potential litigation.
In this context, the suggestion that tough nondisclosure
policies would be embraced by a nonprofit membership
organization devoted to the promotion of civil liberties would
seem something of a bad joke. Nevertheless, the New York
Times reported in 2006 that the board of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), stung by negative publicity attendant
to news interviews with some of its own board members, was
proceeding to develop new policies to curb certain forms of
board members' public criticism of the organization and of
fellow board members.
One idea that circulated among
members would have discouraged criticism that would reflect
negatively on the integrity of the ACLU's decision making
process or the capability of its staff members.3 9
After publication of the New York Times report, some donors
and former board and staff members of the ACLU called for the
ouster of the organization's leadership, asserting it "failed to
adhere to the principles it demands of others and thus
jeopardized the organization's effectiveness. ' ' 40 An attorney in
the office of New York's Attorney General reportedly contacted
the organization informally to ensure that nothing in any of the
41
proposed rules discouraged the reporting of illegal

activity.

39 Stephanie Strom, A.C.L.U. May Block Criticism by Its Board, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2006, at A20.
40 Stephanie Strom, Supporters of A. C.L. U. Call for the Ouster of Its Leaders,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at A14; see also Wendy Kaminer, How the ACLU Lost
Its Bearings, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2006, at M3; Stephanie Strom, A. C.L. U. Withdraws
Proposalsto Limit Public Criticism by Board Members, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2006,
at A16.
41 Compare Memorandum from Susan Herman to the NYCLU Board (2006) (on
file with author) (setting forth that the NY Times report "did not mention what the
committee had actually been asked to do... that the committee had firmly rejected
the idea of imposing any sanctions on directors (like expulsion) ...[and] that, at the
end of the meeting, [the executive director] announced that the committee needed
to go back to the drawing board ....") with Memorandum from Ira Glasser to
Susan Herman (2006) (on file with author) (explaining that everyone who has read
those proposals-except for the nine ACLU committee members who voted for
them, the Board members who defended them, and the executive committee that
reviewed them five months earlier and failed to object to them-"clearly sees how
they hypocritically violate fundamental ACLU free speech principles." Many
argued that the reason the Board didn't vote was because a more deliberative
process was required.
"Then after much unfavorable publicity and donor
complaints, Nadine [Strossen] called ... and forcefully requested [the chair] to get
the committee to withdraw the proposals that the Board had only a few weeks ago
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Perhaps due to negative publicity about the proposals and the
New York Attorney General's intervention or else because the
proposals never had sufficient support to go forward, the board
42
never voted on the proposals.
For present purposes, it is remarkable that no legal
impediment would have prevented implementation of a
proposed policy of board self-censorship and reprisal for
information sharing had the board acted through a bylaw change
to suppress dissemination of information that would reflect
negatively on the decision-making process. Short of a rule
preventing board members from notifying regulators that laws
have been or are about to be broken, a policy preventing
disclosure of internal disputes-especially policy discussions
designated as confidential-does not violate any state law, or
any set of applicable governance principles.43 In fact, the
proposed American Law Institute's Principles of Nonprofit
Governance impose an affirmative obligation on the part of
governing board members to maintain secrecy.44
refused to allow a vote to reject."). See also Letter from Members of the Executive
Board of the ACLU to "ACLU Friends and Colleagues" (October 3, 2006) (on file
with author).
42 See supra note 41.
43 As a general rule, however, the duty of loyalty prevents directors and officers
from profiting from transactions through secret arrangements. See, e.g., N.Y.
N.P.C.L. Sec. 715.
44 See AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 340(b), at
311 (Tentative Draft No. 1, Nov. 1, 2007). Section 340, subsection (b) states that
each member of the governing board "[m]ust preserve the confidentiality of
information that the board member knows or has reason to know is confidential,"
and contains an exception for a board member to disclose in good faith "to the
attorney general or other regulator or to a court confidential information that he or
she reasonably believes appropriate to prevent, mitigate, or remedy harm to the
charity." Id. The comment to subsection (b) explains that confidential information
"includes details of board deliberations and opinions expressed by and votes of
fellow board members." Id. § 340(b) cmt. c, at 315. The confines of the duty are
subject to some modification by the organizational documents, see id. § 305, at 4748, and the comments to section 300 observe that while
[h]ealthy debate is good for governance[,] [a]n outvoted board member...
should respect the confidentiality of board deliberations, and should not
impede the implementation of decisions properly reached by the governing
board. Once a final decision has been reached, public criticism might be
If disagreements are
permissible consistent with fiduciary duties.
fundamental and material, a board member who is unable to support
decisions of the board should consider resigning.
Id. § 300(a) cmt. f, at 32 (citations omitted). Confidential information is defined in
section 340, comment c, as "nonpublic information that (or other person working or
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B. Committee Charters
A second indicator that attitudes about consultation and

sharing fiduciary responsibilities among board members are
changing appears in the widespread enthusiasm for the formal
adoption of committee charters, and the resulting impact on
information flow and decision making. Governance specialists

increasingly express the view that the recent "charter
movement," with its inclination to formalize and contain
committee responsibilities, reflects a reasonable step toward
improving the functionality of boards: an effort to increase

accountability and efficiency by designating and clarifying
responsibilities within governing bodies, which in the world of
nonprofit corporations operate collectively.45
The trend toward the formal adoption of committee charters
has grown markedly in recent years as a result of encouragement

to transplant the audit committee accountability measures
legislated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for for-profits, and in the
wake of for-profit scandals epitomized in the failures of Enron
Corporation and WorldCom Corporation at the turn of the
millennium. 46 Virtually all who counsel nonprofit organizations

about "best practices" recommend written committee charters
for audit committees, and most recommend them for most or all
important committees. 7
volunteering for the organization) has been given or learned in his or her capacity
as a board member." Id. § 340(b) cmt. c, at 315.
45 But see, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan, What's Good for the Goose is Not Good for
the Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981
(2007).
46 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006)). This
provision requires that the audit committee of the board of directors "shall establish
procedures for-(A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by
the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters;
and (B) the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of
concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters." See also Regina
F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: The Standard of Care and the
Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 WYO. L. REV. 481, 531 (2006); Richard A.
Wiley, Sarbanes-Oxley:
Does It Really Apply to Non-Profit and Private
Corporations?, 50 BOSTON B. J. 10, 13 (Mar./Apr. 2006) (recommending that all
sizeable nonprofits adopt "three standing Board Committees: Audit, Governance,
and Compensation. Each is important and should have clear charters as to
responsibilities and authority.").
47 See, e.g., McDermott Will & Emery, Best Practices: Nonprofit Corporate
Governance, http://www.mwe.com/info/news/wp0604a.pdf (last visited Sept. 16,
2007) (recommending a written audit committee charter).
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Through the lens developed here, however, there are
potential adverse consequences to be evaluated along with the
positive gains. Have those charters which actually are being
adopted served, in fact, to protect committees from interference
and second-guessing? Have committee charters discouraged
information from flowing from committees down to managers or
sideways to other board members? Have they sanctioned a
"hyperdelegation" which transcends what the laws previously
allowed? Do they contribute to the tendency to concentrate
legal responsibility for monitoring in fewer hands? Written
charters are, in many instances, adopted by unilateral
amendments to bylaws and can reduce the number of persons
who are responsible for making decisions, restrict membership
on committees to specialists rather than generalists, and isolate
and confine responsibility. To the extent that the number of
directors involved in deliberating on important issues shrinks, it
is at least possible that losses from diminished deliberation could
be as significant as gains in formal accountability. 48
Consider People ex rel. v. Grasso in which the Chairman of
the New York Stock Exchange, at the time a nonprofit
corporation, received in excess of $150 million in compensation
over the course of a short time period. 49 Details of the
compensation package that were known to the compensation
committee were unknown to members of the wider board, who
testified "that they did not know about the [Supplemental
Executive Retirement Plan] and if they did, they did not know
what the balance was., 50 The court characterized this as an
"affirmative defense of neglect," and declared that for "a
fiduciary of any institution, profit or not-for-profit, [to] honestly
admit that he was unaware of a liability of over $100 million, or
51
even over $36 million, is a clear violation of the duty of care.
And yet for-profit corporations have adopted compensation
48 On the other hand, the recent case of People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso suggests
that courts are, at least in extreme circumstances, disinclined to accept
compartmentalized responsibilities that result in violation of fiduciary duties. See
People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, No. 401620/04, Slip op., 2006 WL 3016952, at *27
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2006), rev'd on other grounds, 836 N.Y.S.2d 40 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2007).
49 See id. at *3.
50 Id. at *31.
51

Id.
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committee charters which grant sole authority for setting

compensation to members of the compensation committee,
limiting the responsibility of other board members to read and
depriving them of authority to review supporting materials that
the compensation committee relies on.52 It is unclear how far
nonprofit corporations will or can go to mirror such for-profit

restrictions.
The debate about whether to extend Sarbanes-Oxley's

requirements for identifying particular committee functions
through charters and for designating financial experts has often
taken place on the assumption that the disadvantage is the cost
of compliance, and the advantage is better supervision and

governance. But the question of whether it changes the dynamic
of nonprofit collaboration in some undesirable ways needs to be
considered, as well.53 It is remarkable that the template for
nonprofit organizations has become widespread without
extended analysis of whether aspects of the movement can lead
to diminished collaboration among board members, and perhaps
to a reduction in the diffusion of important knowledge to larger
circles.54
52 See generally the McDonald's Corporation Compensation Committee Charter,
http://www.mcdonalds.com/corp/invest/gov/boardcommittees/
available
at
compensationcommittee.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2007) (giving Compensation
Committee exclusive control over executive officers' and other employees'
compensation packages).
53 In the for-profit context, some have resisted the application of the charters for
the purposes for which they were intended. See Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to
Reforming CorporateGovernance: The Diffusion of QLCCs, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
1251, 1293 (2005) (referring to the Sherman & Stearling survey finding that "[t]he
audit committees of sixty of the Top 100 companies have attempted to ... limit the
scope of the issues that audit committees will consider. They also have attempted
to limit the reports that audit committees receive about compliance." The survey
also states that "[f]ifteen of the Top 100 companies include in their audit
committee's charter exculpatory language to the effect that it is 'not [the] audit
committee's responsibility to ensure compliance with laws."').
54 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of
Internally UndemocraticNonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 830 (2003) (claiming that
the state now manages and directs the market for free enterprise); Dana Brakman
Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit
Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 212-15 (2004) (identifying inadequate
thought given to mission enforcement); see also Larry Cata Backer, Surveillance
and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After SarbanesOxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 437 (2004) (suggesting principally with respect
to for-profits that "the architecture of 'detect and report' so prominent in
[Sarbanes-Oxley] easily fits into the sort of anti-corruption statutes that have risen
to prominence in the last thirty years.").
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During the drafting of the American Law Institute's Principles

of Nonprofit Governance (Nonprofit Principles Project), debates
about circumscribing the duties of directors exposed a divide
between practitioners and academics about the virtues of
extending, further than in current law, immunities resulting from
the delegation and specialization of responsibilities.
The
Nonprofit Principles Project does not address the relevance of

this argument

to the accelerating trend toward defining

specialized board responsibilities by using committee charters.5 6

The argument was pressed, however, that directors who are not
assigned to particular committees or recruited onto boards for
fundraising purposes should be freed from general fiduciary
duties and oversight responsibilities-even

if those duties

involve acts as simple as reading committee reports or going to
meetings.5 7
C. Streamlined Governance

A third indicator that attitudes about consultation and sharing
fiduciary responsibilities among board members are changing is
regulatory pressure to restructure-to "downsize"
or
55 See AM. L. INST., supra note 44. Section 300, Fiduciary Duties, provides that
"[e]ach governing-board member shall in good faith exercise the fiduciary duties of
loyalty (§ 310) and care (§ 315)." The comments elaborate that "[t]he board (or
committee) makes decisions as a group." Id. at § 300, cmt. c(1). The draft
particularly states the duty to protect information flow, but does not require
consultation and collaboration. See § 320, Board Responsibilities, Functions, and
Composition, which states:
(a) All powers of the charity are exercised by or under the authority of its
governing board, and the activities and affairs of the charity are managed
by, or under the direction and subject to the oversight of, the governing
board (see § 325). The governing board must ensure that those persons
who are responsible for the affairs of the charity are clearly identified. (b)
Subject to any authority reserved to the charity's membership or other
person, the governing board's functions normally include, but are not
limited to: ...(7) overseeing appropriate communication with the charity's
constituencies and the public; and (8) establishing appropriate procedures
for internal controls, including financial controls, legal compliance, and
information flow to the board.
56 Id.at § 320.
57 See AM. L. INST., supra note 44, § 300, at 25; § 300(a) cmt. b. The Principles
leave "open significant questions," especially "what does it mean to say '[slome, but
less than all, of the powers' of the board can be assigned to a designated body?" Id.
at xxxviii (quoting id.§ 320 cmt. b(2)(a), at 119). Nevertheless they "endorse ...
the view that all board members should bear responsibility for governance." Id. at
xxxviii-xxxix.
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"streamline"-advisory boards and consultation mechanisms.
Advice encouraging streamlining usually emphasizes two
important aspects of nonprofit governance: that most nonprofit
board members are volunteers whose time and energy should be
marshaled carefully; and that nonprofits must, in a marketdriven economy and a crisis-oriented world, make important
decisions entrepreneurially and rapidly.5 8
Streamlining nonprofit governance by shortening the
opportunities for discussion and for reconsideration of important
questions is clearly an appropriate way for many boards to
improve their operative efficiency.
On the other hand,
streamlining intrinsically requires the reduction or elimination of
deliberative and consultative input, and sometimes amounts to a
descriptive euphemism which softens the reality of changes in
power relationships that are actually at the core of what the
organization seeks to accomplish. 59 As environmental and
consumer advocates have learned to their dismay, the
streamlining of review processes is too often a vehicle for
eliminating public input. 60 Likewise, in the area of nonprofit
governance, streamlining may mean reducing the opportunity
for board input in management decisions, or for previously
involved constituencies to protect their own interests.
The Red Cross made intensive efforts to streamline its
governance structure after being caught in a spotlight of
intensive congressional investigation and massive publicity in the
wake of its handling of relief in the 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina
disasters.6 ' In that context, the Red Cross announced that it
58 See CHAIT ET AL., supra note 26; see also Cornerstone Consulting Assoc., LLC,
About Us:
Our Clients, http://www.cornerstoneconsultingassociates.com
clients.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2007) (consultant helped streamline amount of

time spent on planning and communication).
59 One scholar of linguistic uses, in fact, defines "streamline" as a euphemism for
"fire," "release," "downsize," and "lay off." Scott Alkire, IntroducingEuphemisms
to Language Learners, INTERNET TESL J., Vol. VIII, No. 5, May 2002, available at
http://iteslj.org/Lessons/Alkire-Euphemisms.html; see also Dustin Solberg, What a
Difference a Citizen Can Make, 'Proposal 121' Rallies Bay Fishing Community,
BRISTOL
BAY
TIMES,
Dec.
14,
2005,
available
at

http://www.renewableresourcescoalition.org/news-updates3.htm
(streamlining
environmental clearance process is a way to reduce or eliminate public input).

of

60 Solberg, supra note 59.
61 See Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python: How the Charitable Response to
September 11 Overwhelmed the Law of DisasterRelief, 36 IND. L. REV. 251, 302-19
(2003); AM. RED CROSS, REP. FOR THE BD. OF GOVERNORS (2006),
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would streamline its board and create a more efficient operating
62
structure. Its plans included cutting back sharply the "size and
management role" of its fifty-member board, all under the
approval of Congress, which had imposed the current board
structure through amendments in 1947 to a subsequent charter. 63
The proposed changes were to shrink the board to between
twelve and twenty members.64 In addition, the chairman would
no longer have been its "principal officer," and instead would
have been designated its CEO.65

According to The New York Times, the interim president
concluded that the Red Cross had "a board designed and set up
by guiding principles from a time that is no longer relevant....
We need to take the board, its design, conventions and operating
66
mechanisms, and bring that board up to today's expectations."
The redistribution of resources, conflicts between smaller and
larger chapters, and executive-level politics were also said to
play a role in the decision to undertake restructuring. 67
The Red Cross consultant on governance, Ira Milstein,
assessed its problem as too much consultation with advisory
"cabinet secretaries" and too much interference from parochial
interests; he referred to the existing board as "meddlesome,
overly influenced by the 35 members elected by local chapters
and too big to move quickly and efficiently." 68 The proposal
gave the board greater authority to pick its own members by
having a board committee nominate candidates,
who would then
S 69
be
elected
by
delegates
to
the
annual
meeting.
enough reform for William Josephson, the formerThis
headwas
of not
the
http://www.redcross.org/static/file-cont5765-lang0_2202.pdf
(noting Hurricane
Katrina's effect on the Red Cross and its impact on the organization's decision to
reorganize and streamline its governance).
62 Stephanie Strom, Red Cross to Streamline Board's Management Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at A16 [hereinafter Strom, Red Cross].
63 1d.; see also Am. Red Cross, Federal Charter of the Am. Red Cross,
http://www.redcross.org/museum/history/charter.asp (last visited Aug. 29, 2007)
(hereinafter Am. Red Cross Charter].
64 Strom, Red Cross, supra note 62.
65

Id.

Id.
67 See Jacqueline L. Salmon, Chapter Overhaul Adds to Red Cross Turmoil,
WASH. POST, June 27, 2006, at A12.
68 Strom, Red Cross, supra note 62.
69 Id.
66
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charities bureau in the New York Attorney General's Office,
who said that the power of the chapters would be
too great, and
"obviously not consistent with good governance. ' , 71
In May 2007, the final adoption of several amendments to the
Red Cross Charter substantially reduced the amount of
consultation required for the Board to approve major
decisions.7 1 Whether the reorganization of the Red Cross will
prove to be a significant gain for the organization will become
clearer over the course of the next several years.
The Red Cross reorganization process presented unusual
difficulties because it was directly in the public spotlight and
because it was chartered federally, and therefore its streamlining
involved more intense scrutiny than otherwise; but the
membership corporation rules in most states neither prohibit
curtailing consultative governance relationships contained in
bylaws, nor establish minimal procedural rules, nor facilitate
challenges to fundamental restructurings by private parties.
Except where nonprofit organizations choose to tie their own
hands by inserting restrictive language in charters and bylaws to
insure constituent input into the modification of customary
consultative practices, state law and administrative agency
practices tolerate near-complete control by board majorities
over consultative procedures, and few have voiced concern over
this approach. Neither the Internal Revenue Service nor state
attorneys general nor statutory rules governing the formation or
modification of governing instruments meaningfully restrict the
downsizing of boards or the elimination of consultative groups.
With respect to nonmembership organizations, and outside
the context of nonprofit governmental bodies, perhaps the only
rule that would bear on the decision of a self-perpetuating group
to eliminate advisory bodies might be a decision to reduce the
size of a board to not less than three persons. 72

Id.
See Am. Red Cross Charter, supra note 63; Press Release, Red Cross, Red
Cross Board Votes to Transform Governance, (Oct. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.redcross.org/pressrelease/0,1077,0_314_5751,00.html.
72 Cf Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.03 (1987). The Act requires that
the board of directors "must consist of three or more individuals, with the number
specified in or fixed in accordance with the articles or bylaws."
70

71
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TABLE 1
ANTICONSULTATIVE TRENDS IN THE BOARDROOM

Indicator

Exaiiimple

Authorization7

Nondisclosure

ACLU

Bylaw

agreements and

modifications,

executive policies
diminish policy

board policy
handbooks, and

debates

director pledges

Formal charters are
capable of
compartmentalizing
authority
Streamlined
governance reduces
consultation with
advisory bodies

f NYSE
Iprocedures
I

Compensation i
committee
and
consultant

__

reports

Red Cross

Senatorial
investigation
and
bylaw
amendments

IV
LEGAL ACCOMMODATION: MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

The new flexibility required of nonprofits-they must be "fast
acting," "responsive to change," and "easily adaptable"-has
also fostered its own set of imperatives insofar as employment
and organizational structure are concerned. In some areas of
activity, for example, it is no longer advisable or even possible to
keep a significant number of professional staff employed with
long-term employment contracts. Preexisting bylaws, governing
instruments, and standards of professional conduct sometimes
stand in the way of adaptability.
A. Compensation

One indicator that management practices are changing at the
expense of traditional nonprofit employment models is the
changing approach toward compensating nonprofit employees.
An earlier section of this article alluded to the approaches
boards use to determine the compensation of executive
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directors, including the emulation by nonprofit board
compensation committees of for-profit procedures and
compensation metrics.
Beneath the executive level, nonprofit managers are
increasingly inclined to jettison older principles of compensation,
which tempered relative accomplishment with egalitarian
impulses and therefore deemphasized bonuses. Approximately
25 percent of nonprofit organizations "offer their key managers
the opportunity to earn cash compensation awards in addition to
their base salaries., 73 Most of these programs are based on
74
incentives tied to performance measures.
Some compensation schemes provide incentives that reward
team accomplishments, but as a general matter group
collaboration and collective responsibility for decision making
make it more difficult for managers to assess individual merit
entitlements. In step with this trend toward more targeted
performance incentives, IRS rules and tax court opinions
accommodate end-of-the-year performance-based bonuses and
other forms of incentive pay that were previously unusual in the
nonprofit sector. 75
B. Employment Security
Employment security policies provide another indicator that
management practices are changing at the expense of traditional
nonprofit employment models.
Courts have also been
deferential when nonprofit managers decide to restructure
poorly performing operating units by dismissing employees, even
when professional staff members lose their positions. Whereas
only a few decades ago professional staff in nonprofit
organizations received increasing protection under labor laws
and under broad interpretations of nonprofit governing

73 James E. Rocco, Making Incentive Compensation Plans Work in Non-Profit
Organizations,THE DEV. RES. GROUP, http://www.drgnyc.com/tips/incentive.html

(last visited June 20, 2007).
74 See id.

75 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rule 200601030 (Jan. 6, 2006) (public nonprofit corporation's
long-term incentive bonus program for its senior managers was found to be
consistent with Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) and would not prevent the
organization from operating exclusively for tax-exempt purposes or otherwise
jeopardize its tax-exempt status).
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instruments and policy handbooks,7,*6 that
picture has changed.
77
In Major v. Memorial Hospitals Ass'n, for example, the court
upheld a hospital's decision to change its anesthesiology

department from its traditionally "open" staff system to a newer
"closed" system that "contracted out" the work using an
exclusive provider.
Because the decision was deemed
"administrative" and not "adjudicative," and was motivated by
the overall problems associated with the operation of the
department, the court determined that the plaintiffs were not
entitled to due process in accordance with the medical staff
bylaws prior to termination of their medical staff privileges. 7s

Such judicial interpretations of bylaw restrictions which favor
wider managerial discretion and greater executive power at the
expense of professional autonomy reflect judicial sympathy with
the contemporary emphasis on advancing the accountability and
financial viability discussed earlier.
C. Mission Drift

Mission drift is another indicator that management practices
are changing. Entrepreneurial activity has been on the rise,
fueled by financial stress. Financially profitable activities,
however, are not necessarily at the core of an organization's
mission.79 On occasion, nonprofits are reported to have chosen
to devote key resources to colorably related activities in order to
76 See Kristin Hay O'Neal, Note, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement
Corporation of America: Possible Implications for Supervisory Status Analysis of
Professionals Under the National Labor Relations Act, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 841, 845
n.15 (1995); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered
Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1775, 1805 n.127, 1856-58
(1989) (observing that the National Labor Relations Board reversed its position on
protection for nonprofit professional employees to include them, emphasizing "the
difficulty of distinguishing commercial from noncommercial activity," and "the
growing congressional sentiment that employees in the nonprofit sector deserve the
same protection as other workers."). NLRA amendments in 1974 extended
nonprofit healthcare workers protection under the Act.
77 Major v. Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
78 Id. at 530-32.
79 Salamon & O'Sullivan, supra note 25, at 4-5 (stating "dramatically, 84 percent
of the organizations reported increasing their attention to commercial sources of
support, including expanded marketing and increased or expanded fee-for-service
activities." Eleven percent of nonprofit elderly and housing services groups studied,
7 percent of child and family services groups, and 12 percent of economic
development groups had started a profit-making subsidiary in 2003 alone.)
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grow or obtain financial stability, rather than to try to
accomplish purposes more essentially related to the ones for
which their founders created them, for which volunteers and
most donors contributed their time and money, and for which
the state originally chartered them.
Surveys indicate, for
example, that theaters and museums have "scaled back the
artistic content of their programming," and shifted to "a more
'commercially appealing' season;" hospitals have invested
80
millions to develop health spas and gyms.
It may appear that the problem of "mission creep" or
"mission drift" is not one that implicates collaboration or
consultation, that it is only an effort to find profitable
opportunity somewhere within the scope of the mission of a
charity. To the extent that exploiting economic opportunity
costs even when the exploitation requires revision of missions
and donor intentions, however, conflicts between managers and
affected constituencies are about involvement in decision
making. Often contemporary conflicts over "donor control" and
"cy pres" amount to conflicts about the extent to which donors
and grantors should be consulted by nonprofit managers."'

80 Id. at 8; see also Curt Bailey & Karla Martin, Getting to "No": How Nonprofit
Organizations Can Stretch Their Limited Resources by Focusing on Prioritiesand
Avoiding Mission Creep, LEADING IDEAS, Nov. 14, 2006, at 1, 2, available at

http://www.strategy-business.com/li/leadingideas/i00002 (claiming that "[f]rontline
managers begin to see the head office not as a source of support, but as a
bureaucracy that issues endless and often conflicting directives, which they must
work around and even ignore to get something accomplished.").
81 See Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 433-34
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001); In re Milton Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d 674, 689-91 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 2005); see also Robert A Katz, Let CharitableDirectors Direct: Why
Trust Law Should Not Curb Board Discretion over a Charitable Corporation's
Mission and UnrestrictedAssets, 80 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 689, 695-98 (2005).
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TABLE 2
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE INDICATORS
KINDICATOR
1

EXAMPLE
11

LEGAL
1AUTHORITY

Compensation

Year-end bonuses

IRS letter rulings

Employment
security

Contracting out

Reinterpretation of
bylaws

Mission drift

Pursuing profitable
activities with
marginal mission
value

Common-law
administrative
decision doctrines

V
LEGAL ACCOMMODATION: MEMBERSHIP RIGHTS

A. Optionality
In a perceptive article titled Dismembering Civil Society: The
Social Cost of Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits
Dana
Brakman Reiser argues that a failure of nonprofit corporation
laws to encourage the use of the membership form of nonprofit
organization, on one hand, and an emphasis on financial
accountability, on the other hand, has impoverished civil society
and diminished "social capital":
[The] focus on accountability ignores the nonprofit sector's
role in constructing and maintaining civil society ....

Theorists

who have examined civil society argue that participation in
these institutions enhances our political democracy in two
ways. It offers opportunities for participants to build norms
of
3
reciprocity and cooperation-also called social capital.
Professor Reiser provides several illustrations of the developing
legal regime's blindness to the value of democratic internal
governance in nonprofit organizations to civil discourse in
82
83

Reiser, supra note 30.
Id. at 830-31 (footnotes omitted).
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democratic society.8 In particular, she singles out the choice
given to incorporators to decide whether to organize as
membership or nonmembership corporations ("optionality," in
her vocabulary).85 In every state and in the Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act, there is no need for organizations of
any sort to organize as membership organizations if they don't
wish to. 86 Other political theorists, tracing back at least to
Talcott Parsons and Robert Dahl, have argued that political
democracy is enhanced by teaching civic skills.87 These skills are
arguably better honed in more consultative organizations.
Accepting Reiser's fundamental point about the civic virtues
inherent to the values she identifies with her version of
membership, there nevertheless is not very much to recommend
membership over nonmembership organizations under the legal
regimes that currently apply to membership organizations.
Without plunging into a debate about trends in social capitalhowever it is defined and measured-it seems that the values of
social discourse and many other civic virtues adhere to most
types of nonprofit form aside from the membership form.
The point deserves to be pressed considerably further. Most
of the factors that Reiser identifies as those leading counselors to
advise incorporators to choose the nonmembership rather than
the membership form are not really factors that weigh against
democracy as such. Nonprofit organizers and managers are
trying to avoid, with increasing frequency, the collaborative and
consultative aspects of nonprofit governance which are tied to
membership and nonmembership corporations alike, but which
historically have been harder to avoid in membership
organizations.
The virtues of consultative and collaborative forms flow from
the same inefficiencies that account for their costs. As Reiser
observes in connection with membership groups:
[T]he costs of such a democratic internal governance structure
are substantial and definite. These include, inter alia, the
84

Id. at 831.

85

Id.

86 See Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, Ch. 7, Sub-Ch. B (Proposed 2006).
87 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY

(1982); ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOOM, POLICIES, ECONOMICS,
AND WELFARE

(Univ. Chi. Press 1976) (1953);

OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).

MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC
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administrative costs of identifying members, maintaining
current membership lists, holding meetings, obtaining a
quorum for such meetings and the required majorities
necessary to elect directors and pass other measures, and
providing materials necessary to inform membership voting.
Further, a voting membership structure imposes costs on
transactions by forcing both a board and a membership
decision on certain significant corporate actions-typically,
amendments of the articles of incorporation, merger, sale of all
can
be
or substantially all assets, and dissolution. These costs
88
avoided entirely through use of a self-perpetuating board.
While the above costs can be avoided entirely through use of a
self-perpetuating board and a nonmembership form, there are
many other costs, risks, and benefits attached to collaboration
and consultation that will adhere regardless of the
membership/nonmembership distinction. From this perspective,
the question is not about the membership form per se, but about
the degree to which collaborative and consultative modes of
operation have diminished across every organizational form.
B. Election Proceduresand Membership Standing
Ironically, case law suggests that, in many states, membership
corporations do not need to incur even the relatively modest
costs of democracy that Reiser suggests. A principal reason is
that nonprofit standing to contest antidemocratic processes has
been restricted quite severely in comparison to for-profits. 89
Courts have displayed a broad deference to the actions taken by
incumbent boards of membership corporations when they
evaluate the permissible efforts that can be taken to insulate
incumbent candidates and allow self-perpetuation of boards
through restrictive bylaw provisions, unwritten campaign rules,
nondisclosure, and even the expenditure of substantial
organizational money.
Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California offers a
dramatic illustration.9 In Olson, challengers ran for the club's
Reiser, supra note 30, at 864 (footnotes omitted).
89 See Russell v. Yale Univ., 737 A.2d 941, 946 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (Yale
alumni membership denied standing); Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in
the CharitableSector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 52-59 (1993). But see In re Milton
Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d 674, 689-691 (members of alumni association granted
standing to contest board settlement agreement based on special interest).
90 Olson v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (certified
for partial publication). For full opinion see Olson v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., No.
88
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board of directors, advocating, inter alia, greater regard for mass
transit issues.9 ' After the club spent $6 million of club funds to
defeat them, the challengers sued to overturn the election and
limit campaign spending to reasonable and proportionate
amounts in relation to the amount spent by the petition
nominees, and to require that opposition campaign statements
and biographies be included in club proxy solicitations. The trial
court decided that these arguments were meritless, because they
were inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The court gave
credence to a defense expert who testified that California's
Nonprofit Mutual Benefit Corporation
Code actually
discouraged elections in routine situations, and it was persuaded
that members do not join the club to get involved in political
controversies and elections, and that artificial stimulation of
elections is a distraction to management. 92 Shortly after the
opinion, the club asked its members to eliminate the election of
directors entirely. Thus, as Olson demonstrates, common law
and statutory protections, even for members of membership and
mutual benefit organizations, have proven to be adjustable in
light of the anticonsultative trends in favor in recent years.

B168730, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), California Courts website, www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
opinions/revpub/Bl68730.DOC (Order of the Court, describing both Olson's
original prayer for relief, as well as additional requests brought forth on appeal)
[hereinafter Olson full opinion].
91 See Olson full opinion, at *2.
92 See id. at *15.
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VI
MEANS AND ENDS IN NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE

Growing up, many of us developed an instinct that
collaboration was usually a good thing. Perhaps because we
were almost never in a position of power or authority as young
people, we resisted autocratic, top-down approaches in
education and family life. We wanted our opinions-however
well informed by knowledge or experience-to count. We
wanted our voices to be heard.
At school, the word
"collaboration" was often used synonymously with "teamwork,"
and consultation with others was almost always highly
encouraged-except, of course, when multiple-choice tests were
administered .
With respect to the use of processes for deliberation in
governance, we acquired the view that collaboration by different
groups with common interests was a necessary but insufficient
component for successful reform in democracies. Collaborative
and consultative impulses usually received endorsement in the
political science and historical literature we were assigned, as
93 See, e.g., Colette Daiute & Bridget Dalton, CollaborationBetween Children
Learning to Write: Can Novices Be Masters? 10 COGNITION & INSTRUCTION 281333 (1993).
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well. This literature typically associated these processes with
freedom, freedom with democracy, and democracy with
legitimate and relatively more effective and honest government.
Collaboration today is still offered inside and outside of
business as a method designed to improve creativity without
regard to any democratic or legitimacy-increasing imperatives.
The legendary origins tales of Silicon Valley all pay homage to
the collaborative impulse as well as to the value of the open
exchange of information. Intrinsically undemocratic institutions
often insist on collaborative and consultative processes within
the context of command and control authority structures. The
Army-which is about as top-down an institution as one might
imagine-praises collaboration as an important aspect of
developing successful tactics and strategy, and also as a method
for sustaining morale.
Among the theories offered to explain why collaborative and
consultative processes are important to the accomplishment of
mission-related goals and objectives are included these four: (1)
that superior supervision and added intelligence result from
consultative discourse because these processes demand
increased attention to the desirability of the course of conduct
advocated; (2) that collaboration incorporates an adversary
contest in which intellectual combat and truth testing increases
the probability of correct answers; (3) that providing
stakeholders with a voice in the operation of an organization
instills a sense of responsibility and leads parties to identify with
the future success of initiatives which have been the object of an
investment; and (4) that the invocation of a communal will
actually improves the reception afforded to corporate activity.
But all of these virtues ought to be weighed against the
Preserving traditions of consultation and
drawbacks.
collaboration can cost more than they are worth in time and
money. As with the case of the American political deliberative
process, it is difficult to agree about how much process is
Collaboration and consultation
necessary or sufficient.
requirements can also: (1) lead to gaming the system through
roadblocks and deadlocks; (2) lead to equivocation and
compromise when bold and decisive action is called for; (3)
make it more difficult to maintain confidentiality when multiple
parties are involved in decision making; (4) undermine
important interests in cohesion and in the projection of a
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common corporate devotion to purpose; and (5) diffuse
responsibility for poor choices. Perhaps there is a negative
relationship between collective forms of governance and
accountability which ought not be dismissed.
The traditional literature about the importance of
collaboration to nonprofit corporate governance asserts either
explicitly or implicitly that, notwithstanding their drawbacks,
they would in the long run generate results preferable to those
eventuating from what might be called the antithesis of
collaboration-namely, authoritarian and autocratic executive
decision making. The traditional claim has been that collective
and collaborative approaches usually serve organizations and the
collective public interest better than does control and decision
making exercised by powerful individuals or small groups that
make decisions in the absence of consultation with group
constituencies, that choose their own successors, and that take
actions without the need either to explain or listen to others.
As indicated, the more recent business consultancy literature
proceeds from an opposite assumption. Whether or not it is
"politically correct" or expedient
to operate along
democratically consultative lines, this literature insists that in the
new climate, nonprofit organizations that reject business
accountability and hierarchical models do so at their peril. It
may be that the legal convergence of nonprofit and for-profit
governance structure and style is the inevitable consequence of
the economic convergence of nonprofit and for-profit activity.94
The response of courts, legislatures, and private lawmaking
projects appears thus far largely to have heeded this business
consultancy counsel, with relatively little resistance from the
organized nonprofit community.
At least one observer has argued that the unwillingness of the
sector to rise to its own defense can be attributed, in addition to
financial and accountability challenges, to the failure to identify
essential valued aspects of the nonprofit culture: "[I]n an era
where being businesslike is the great American ideal, the
94 Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-ProfitOrganizationalForms,40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 457, 535-36

(1996) (stating that the legal and economic differences between nonprofit and forprofit organizations are "more of a degree than of kind," but that the two types of
organizations should not necessarily be legally treated the same "based solely on
the implications from economics").
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nonprofit sector has been unable or unwilling to mount a stirring
call to nonprofit-ness-let alone develop a rigorous model of
what being nonprofit-like might mean." 95 Without further
empirical work, it is not possible to evaluate this sort of response
and determine whether the nonprofit legal regime, or particular
parts of it, should fortify consultative and collaborative
standards and resist recent developments.
Broader questions also deserve more attention. Is success in
meeting the accountability and viability challenges at the
individual level weakening long-term welfare at the collective
level? At what point will the distinctions between nonprofit and
for-profit operations cease to be significant enough to justify the
privileges, benefits, and esteem that the legal and political
system afford?
At the intersection of legal structure and political theory, even
if there proves to be no genuine concern about the impact of
legal trends on the collective welfare of the nonprofit sector,
there may still be an unfortunate relationship between the
demise of traditional governance rules and democracy and social
capital. Under these circumstances, retaining and reinforcing
traditional collaborative values still should have a greater
priority.
The task ahead is to determine the extent to which nonprofit
law should continue to encourage nonprofits to adopt for-profit
governance and management practices. If the proliferation of
hybrid corporate forms in recent years is any indication, it may
be that more differentiation among the choices for incorporation
(and the legal privileges and duties attached), rather than less,
will be desirable. 6
As they evaluate the changes discussed above, courts and
legislatures would do well to factor in those core values that
have supported the special treatment nonprofits continue,
somewhat precariously, to receive.

95 Light, supra note 19.
96 See Brody, supra note 94, at 535 (offering an explanation for convergence).
But see Evelyn Brody, Book Note, The Twilight of OrganizationalFormfor Charity:
Musings on Norman Silber, A Corporate Form of Freedom: The Emergence of the

Modern Nonprofit Sector, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1261, 1267 (2002) (resisting

proposals that would differentiate legal standards based on the type of charitable
activity).
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